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ABSTRACT: 
Purpose: Whilst substantial evidence from low corruption, developed market 
environments supports the view that more productive firms are more likely to export, 
there has been little research into analysing the link between productivity and exports in 
high corruption, developing market environments. The purpose of this paper is twofold. 
First, to test the premise of self-selection theory whether the association between 
productivity and export is maintained in high corruption environments, and second to 
identify other variables explaining export activity in high corruption contexts, including 
cluster networks and firms’ competences.  
Design/methodology/approach: The authors draw on the World Bank Enterprise survey 
to undertake a cross-section analysis including 1,233 SMEs located in nine African 
countries. The advantage of this database is that it contains information about the level 
of perceived corruption at firm-level. Logistic regressions are performed for the full 
sample and for subsamples of firmsin high and low corruption environments.  
Findings: The findings demonstrate that the self-selection theory only applies to low 
corruption environments, whereas in high corruption environments, alternative factors 
such as cluster networks and outward looking competences, exert a stronger influence on 
the exporting activity of African SMEs.  
Research implications/limitations: This research contributes to theory as it provides 
evidence that contradicts the validity of self-selection theory in high corruption 
environments. Our findings would benefit from further longitudinal investigation.  
Practical implications: African SMEs need to consider cluster networks and outward 
looking competences as important strategic factors that might enhance their international 
competitiveness.   
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Originality/value: Our criticism of the self-selection theory is distinctive in the 
literature and has important implications for future research. We show that the 
contextualisation of existing theories matters and this opens a research avenue for further 
more sensitive contextualisation of existing theories in developing economies.  
 Keywords: Exports, Productivity, Self-selection, Corruption, Networking, Outward 
Looking Competences, Cluster, African SMEs, World Bank Enterprise Survey.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A variety of studies have validated the so-called self-selection theory; that more 
productive firms are more capable of exporting and competing in international markets (Aw, 
Chung & Roberts, 2000; Melitz, 2003; Melitz & Otoviano, 2008; Temouri, Vogel & Wagner, 
2013). However, there are geographical contexts in which established managerial theories 
like self-selection have not been tested. In this study we evaluate the application of self-
selection theory in the context(s) of Africa. In so doing we respond to recent calls for 
contextualizing international business research by testing the relevance of established theories 
in contexts such as Africa (Teagarden, Von Glinow and Mellahi, 2017). Several studies 
investigating the effect of productivity on the exporting behaviour of firms [Temouri, et al. 
(2013) for UK, Germany and France, Cassiman & Golovko (2011) for Spain, Aw, Chung & 
Roberts (2000) for emerging economies like Taiwan, and Clerides, Lack, & Tybout (1998) 
for developing countries like Colombia and Morocco], provide evidence that firms with 
higher productivity levels are more likely to self-select themselves into export markets. 
However, other studies seem to demonstrate that exporting firms are more productive not 
because they self-select themselves but rather because they actually learn-by-exporting as 
they start interacting with more competitive foreign firms and more demanding customers 
and suppliers (Fernandes & Isgut, 2005; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Martins & Yang, 2009; 
Love & Ganotakis, 2013; Salomon & Shaver, 2005).  
Research on the exporting behaviour of African SMEs has been scarce and the limited 
existing evidence is far from being conclusive. To shed light on this debate, this study aims to 
examine the impact of productivity on the exporting behavior of African small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). This is important because in recent years, African firms have 
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become increasingly engaged in international trade via exports (Ibeh, Wilson & Chizema, 
2012). As a result, African countries’ share of global trade has risen significantly in the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century (Ndikumana, 2015). The extent to which their productivity 
influences their capacity to compete in international markets merits academic and scholarly 
attention. We focus on SMEs’ because their international activities are generally limited to 
export and therefore are ideal for examining the relationship between productivity and 
exports. In addition, SMEs contribute over 50% towards GDP in African countries and 
represent over 90% of private business in Africa (Omer, Van Burg, Peters, & Visser, 2015).  
However, as it is widely documented, the business environment in most African 
countries is not conducive to SMEs’ success and has a negative impact on their output and 
productivity (Bah & Fang, 2015). Therefore, we argue that the impact of productivity on 
export engagement is moderated by the quality of the business environments supporting or 
hindering exporting firms, such as the presence of institutional voids. For instance the 
presence of corruption can distort institutional and business environments and be 
economically damaging (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Therefore, our main research question is 
whether in high corruption contexts, invisible barriers may have a detrimental effect on the 
capacity of African SMEs to compete in international markets. We argue that in such 
contexts, more productive firms may not necessarily be the ones more capable of overcoming 
the barriers to export and so may not exhibit higher levels of exports.  
The international marketing and international business literatures indicate other factors 
enabling export capacity. Some research studies have indicated that being located in network 
cluster zones can help shield firms from an ineffective business environment and help them 
learn to be efficient by facilitating networking with other firms inside the cluster (Fafchamps 
et al., 2008; Naudé & Matthee, 2010). Thus, in this study we examine how networking 
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capabilities developed within cluster zones enhance the exporting capacity of African SMEs. 
As evidenced by previous studies, networks provide firms with access to resources, know-
how, technologies and markets through enduring exchange relationships with other network 
members (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Networking capacity may be particularly important for 
SMEs as they lack the scale and resources of large MNEs to internationalise easily on their 
own (Naudé & Havanga, 2005). Previous studies have also indicated that the possession of 
outward-looking competences (OLC), understood as the capacity to communicate quality 
signals to external stakeholders through technology based mechanisms, enhances the export 
capacity of developing market firms located in geographically isolated regions (Vendrell-
Herrero, Gomes, Mellahi, & Child, 2017). International expansion, especially from more 
isolated regions like Africa, may be more difficult as local firms have to move across 
geographical, cultural and institutional barriers to reach foreign markets. Hence, this paper 
also investigates the role of OLC that enhance firm’s image and reputation in international 
markets and ultimately the export capacity of African SMEs.  
The paper makes several important contributions. First, it contributes to the much larger 
literature on the internationalization of firms from developing markets by focusing on the 
exporting behaviour of African SMEs. More specifically, it provides much needed empirical 
evidence on the effect of productivity on the exporting capacity of African SMEs. This is 
important because it helps identify and test other limitations of the self-selection theory when 
applied to contexts characterised by high levels of corruption. This is a major theoretical 
contribution as several scholars have consistently demanded for the development of more 
context suitable theories for the case of emergent markets like Latin America (Carneiro et al., 
2015) and especially of Africa (Teagarden et al,. 2017). As asserted by Amankwah-Amoah, 
Boso & Debrah (2017, pp. 11), in the case of Africa “there remains a need for the 
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development of indigenous concepts and issues to explain the effects of institution-based 
factors.” Additionally, understanding the limitations of the self-selection theory in the 
African context, characterised by high levels of corruption provides an important contribution 
because as argued by Cuervo-Cazurra (2016), results about the impact of corruption at the 
firm level are inconclusive and lack further empirical support. Second, the paper will enhance 
our understanding of how networking capabilities and the possession of outward-looking 
competences are conducive to higher levels of exports in complex institutional contexts. An 
important empirical contribution of this study is that we use a firm level measure of 
corruption. This is unique because most previous studies have used country level measures of 
corruption such as the Bribe Payer’s Index (Baughn et al., 2010), the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (Wilhelm, 2002) and other country level measures (Husted, 1999; Montinola & 
Jackman, 2002) which amalgamate information from various surveys and create a single 
country level indicator (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). In this study we use a firm level measure of 
corruption derived from a large data set of African SMEs obtained from the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys, in which the managers from the firms included in the analysis share the 
perceived level of corruption in the business environment in which their companies operate.  
The paper is structured as follows. First we provide a review of the background 
literature and develop our hypotheses. In doing so, we first resort to the self-selection 
literature to explain the linkage between productivity and exports. We then review some of 
the main acknowledged limitations of self-selection theory and justify our argument about the 
limitations of self-selection theory in contexts characterised by high levels of corruption. In 
the following section of the paper we explain the research methods adopted and this is 
followed by the section containing the main findings of the study. Finally, we discuss the 
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implications of the findings for both theory and practice and provide suggestions for future 
research.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
Self-selection theory and exports: applicability and acknowledged limitations 
The race for global reach has increased the pressure for firms to internationalise. For 
SMEs this tends to mean exporting, rather than use of other expansion modes, as this requires 
less resources, foreign market knowledge and commitment (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The 
limited resource base of African SMEs (Sapienza et al., 2006) makes exporting attractive as 
an effective mechanism in helping overcome resource paucity as well as geographical and 
institutional distances. However, evidence from previous studies seems to demonstrate the 
existence of self-selection mechanisms, as only more productive firms are capable of entering 
the export market and competing with international competitors (Altomonte et al., 2013; 
Becker & Egger, 2013; Wagner, 2007). Melitz (2003) even argues that unlike other strategic 
choices, such as industry or product portfolio diversification, which are mostly motivated by 
endogenous factors, the decision to enter international markets is primarily based on an 
understanding of how a firm’s competitiveness and productivity compares to that of local and 
foreign competitors. In sum, the self-selection theory argues that firms able to reach a certain 
threshold in terms of productivity are more capable to compete in international markets. 
Based on this well established framework, we propose the following baseline hypothesis:  
H1: Higher levels of productivity are conducive to higher likelihood of exporting.  
However, some questions can be raised about the applicability of the self-selection 
theory in developed economies. For example, it can be questioned whether higher 
productivity levels influence firms to export (self-selection theory) or whether exports lead to 
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higher levels of productivity (learning-by-exporting theory) (Ganotakis & Love, 2012; 
Salomon & Shaver, 2005). There is also a more consensual understanding that increased 
levels of innovation may also be associated with productivity improvement and the capacity 
to export (Love & Roper, 2015). In this sense, Paul, Parthasarathy & Gupta (2017) assert that 
Vernon’s (1979) international product life-cycle theory helps to reconcile both positions 
because it suggests that innovation enhances the competitiveness of domestic firms, which in 
turn become more productive and competitive in foreign markets as well. Moreover, these 
authors suggest that less innovative firms are not able to enter foreign markets until their 
productivity capacity has been improved. Evidence from an extensive longitudinal research 
by Cassiman & Golovko (2011) shows that the self-selection causal effect of productivity on 
exports is only evident in the case of non-innovative firms. This may be explained by the fact 
that innovative firms are capable of competing in foreign markets, not necessarily because 
they are more productive (before exporting) but because they are capable of differentiating 
their products from those of foreign competitors. This rationale is also applicable to the case 
of born-global firms because of their innovative capacity and differentiated narrow product 
offer (Glaister et al., 2014).  
Despite these acknowledged limitations, the self-selection theory is widely accepted. 
Hence the above mentioned criticisms seek to better understand the contextual nuances of the 
theory. In essence, the critiques do not reject that ultimately the most productive firms end up 
being able to demonstrate their superiority in international markets. In this research we aim to 
understand additional limitations of this theory in the context of high corruption 
environments.   
 
Limitations of the self-selection theory in high corruption environments 
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As discussed above, the self-selection theory explains how more productive firms are 
more capable of entering the export market. However, the applicability of this theory in 
environments characterised by high corruption can be questioned. Various scholars have been 
increasingly highlighting the importance of testing the validity of existing marketing 
(Amankwah-Amoah, Boso, & Debrah, 2017; Arnould, Price & Moisio, 2006) and 
international business theories (Michailova, 2011; Teagarden et al., 2017) in different 
contexts. As Boyacigiller & Adler (1991) argued, scholars need to move away from 
‘‘contextual parochialism’’ deeply entrenched in the Western Anglo-North American 
paradigm in order to be able to capture the nuances across different contexts and avoid 
theoretical and methodological biases. Numerous scholars have argued this to be the case in 
Africa, where theoretical models and managerial practices are imported without taking 
sufficient account of the local context (Amankwah-Amoah, Boso, & Debrah, 2017; Anakwe, 
2002; Angwin, Mellahi, Gomes, & Peter, 2016; Gomes, Mellahi, Angwin, & Peter, 2012; 
Kamoche, Debrah, Horwitz, & Muuka, 2004; Kamoche et al., 2012).  
As such, we test the applicability of the self-selection theory in the context of Africa in 
which, despite all the recent acknowledged political, economic, financial, institutional and 
technological developments (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015, 2016; Debrah, 2007; Elmawazini & 
Nwankwo 2012) most countries still face major challenges like low diversification and high 
dependence on extractive natural resources (The Economist, 2016), inadequate transportation, 
communications and energy infrastructures (Aker & Mbiti, 2010) and human resource 
management issues (Kamoche et al., 2004), which hinder the competitiveness of African 
firms, especially of those willing to compete in international markets (Ibeh, Wilson & 
Chizema, 2012).  
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However, despite recent improvements and reforms, it is still commonly acknowledged 
that one of the main factors hampering the long-term growth and global competitiveness of 
African firms is existence of high levels of market imperfections and institutional voids like 
the “absence of market supporting institutions, specialized intermediaries, contract enforcing 
mechanisms” (Acquaah, 2012, pp. 1216), resulting in the development of high levels of 
corruption prevalent in African public organizations (Ibeh, 1999; Kimuyu, 2007). Corruption, 
defined by Cuervo-Cazurra (2016, pp. 36) as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ 
increases the costs of doing business (Kimuyu, 2007), thus reducing firm productivity, and 
inhibiting firms from competitively reaching international markets (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). 
This author asserts that public corruption is manifested when politicians or civil servants 
obtain a bribe in exchange of favours to individuals or companies.  
Several country level characteristics such as, low institutional development, culture of arms-
length relationships, ethnic and ethnolinguistic diversity, and cultural dimensions, are more 
conducive to higher corruption levels (Mauro, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Tanzi, 1995; 
Zheng, Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kwok, 2013). However, Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) argues that 
corruption at the firm level does not necessarily have a negative impact on firm performance. 
Corruption may have a positive effect on firm performance and therefore be seen “as ‘grease 
in the wheels of commerce’ that enables the company to operate better… when it is the 
manager who offers to pay a bribe to get something that helps the company” (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2016, pp. 40). Through corrupt relationships, managers expect to be able to 
minimise transaction costs in uncertain markets, by circumventing burdensome and unclear 
bureaucratic procedures and regulations (Lui, 1985). 
In environments characterised by high levels of corruption, political connections and 
longstanding relationships with government officials can benefit companies from expediency 
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in the issuance of legal permits and authorisations as government officials prioritise those 
firms willing to pay a bribe (Chen, Ding, & Kim, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Fisman, 
2001; Lui, 1985). Conversely, corruption can have a negative effect and be seen as ‘sand in 
the wheels of commerce’ when “it limits the ability of the company to operate efficiently” 
when government officials demand the payment of bribes which act like ‘informal’ additional 
taxes on firms (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016, pp. 40). The costs associated with corruption are not 
only due to the payment of bribes but also with the time that managers have to devote in 
managing complex relationships with crooked officials (Kaufmann, 1997) and the uncertainty 
generated by such modus operandi, as managers can never be sure whether government 
officials will deliver the expected favour or will ask for additional bribes (Uhlenbruck et al., 
2006; Wei, 2000). Therefore, it is essential to understand the effects of corruption on the 
competitiveness and subsequent exporting behaviour of African SMEs. Based on the above 
arguments we hypothesise that: 
H2.a: The self-selection argument (productivity leads to higher likelihood of exporting) is 
applicable to low corruption contexts; but 
H2.b: in contexts with high levels of corruption, productivity does not lead to higher 
likelihood of exporting.  
 
Alternative explanations to the self-selection theory in high corruption environments: 
The effect of cluster networks 
We have argued that in contexts with high corruption environments, relationships 
between managers and government officials can help minimise transaction costs and 
overcome burdensome and unclear bureaucratic procedures and regulations and help 
companies benefit from expediency in the issuance of legal permits. In this instance Acquaah 
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(2012, pp. 1217) argues that in developing African markets characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty and market imperfections, it is essential for managers to develop networking 
relationships with “government political leaders, bureaucratic officials, and community 
leaders to secure access and facilitate the exchange of resources, information, and knowledge 
for the organization of their activities.”  
Underpinned by the social capital theory, various studies have recognised that 
longstanding networking relationships provide companies with access to markets, resources, 
and knowledge, (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Inkepen & Tsang, 2005). Through personal, social and professional 
relationships between the various networking players, financial, human and other resources 
and competences, and business opportunities are transferred across networking members 
(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). The importance of relationships and networking seems to be 
particularly relevant in the African socio-cultural context (Anakwe, 2002; Boso, Story & 
Cadogan, 2013). This is the case because of the Ubuntu, a “philosophical and cultural form of 
communal humanism” (Cunha et al., 2017, pp. 3) prevalent in most Sub-Saharan countries 
(Mangaliso, 2001). It presupposes a collectivistic, interactive and interdependent relational 
network of reciprocal commitments and benefits (Cunha et al., 2017; Gomes et al., 2015; 
Kamoche, Chizema, Mellahi, & Newenham-Kahindi, 2012), underpinned by “the belief in a 
universal bond of sharing that can be developed and leveraged to boost the value” for 
individuals and organisations (Amankwah-Amoah, Boso, & Debrah, 2017, pp. 3). As argued 
by Cleeve, Debrah & Yiheyis (2015), it contributes to social capital development and can 
provide a competitive advantage to exporting African companies. In this study we focus on 
enduring and repeated networking relationships taking place between government officials, 
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competitors, suppliers, buyers, intermediaries and other institutions and organisations located 
in cluster network zones.  
As noted by Aranguren et al. (2014) cooperation and linkages between the various 
players are essential components of such network associations. The advantage that cluster 
networks confer on involved companies is connectedness. This created advantage may take 
several forms and results from the geographical concentration of government agencies and 
institutions, competitors, suppliers and customers which may reduce transaction costs, allow 
economies of scale, provide firms with shorter feedback loops for innovation, allow the 
exchange and creation of knowledge through face-to-face interactions and the creation of 
common languages and institutions – particularly important if uncertainty is high, and trial 
and error is required in the process of new product development (Solvell & Zander 1998). So, 
spatial proximity brings competitive advantage if the firm has to manage a complex set of 
networking interdependencies with clients, suppliers and governmental institutions (Porter 
1998), as is the case in high corruption environments. These social networks, therefore, are 
expected to confer significant advantages to affiliates in domestic and foreign markets.  
Understanding the impact of networking relationships on the export performance of 
African SMEs is essential because most African countries suffer from lack of supporting 
market institutions and mechanisms (Acquaah, 2012). It is in such contexts that networking 
relationships and ties, especially with government officials and politicians, can facilitate the 
acquisition of the necessary knowledge and resources and competences, to operate markets 
characterised by high levels of uncertainty, complexity and volatility. It is important to 
understand that in African countries, politicians have enormous power and capacity to 
influence the “the award of major projects and contracts, and access to financial resources for 
business activities, while bureaucratic officials control the regulatory and licensing 
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procedures such as providing certification and approval to newly manufactured products as 
meeting government standards” (Acquaah, 2012, pp. 1217).  
 While previous studies have not investigated the effect of networking relationships on 
the exporting capacity of African SMEs, in our study we predict that networking capability 
plays a positive role on the exporting level of firms located in high corruption environments. 
This positive effect can be partly explained by what Nadvi (1999) called collective 
efficiency- the benefits that accrue from joint action. Collective efficiency is an important 
component for international growth and competitiveness. One must not forget that one of the 
important measures of cluster network competitiveness is its capacity to export products to 
other regions (Austrian, 2000). Sonobe et al.’s (2011) findings show that higher levels of 
exports in African firms tend to be correlated with more entrepreneurial, innovative and 
marketing capabilities, which may potentially be maximized when firms located in exports 
hubs benefit from networking capabilities (Fafchamps et al., 2008; Naudé & Matthee, 2010). 
Based on this we posit:  
H3: In high corruption environments firms benefiting from network/cluster have a higher 
likelihood of exporting. 
 
The effect of outward looking competences 
New international markets provide exporting firms the opportunity to reach 
significantly higher revenues and scale. However, in order to reach foreign markets exporting 
firms, especially from more isolated geographical markets such as Africa, have to overcome 
geographical, institutional, economic and cultural distances. As indicated long ago by 
Keesing (1967), developing country governments need help their export manufacturing sector 
firms develop “Outward Looking Competences” (OLC) in order to increase their 
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international competitiveness.  In the words of Keesing (1967; p. 304) developing countries 
have to make an extra effort “to remain in touch, absorb the latest technology, catch up and 
become competitive with the most advanced industrial countries”. Research findings in the 
context of Asia corroborate this view showing that outward looking policies developed in the 
1970s and 1980s were critical for the development of international competitiveness of their 
export manufacturing firms. Recent research findings in the context of Latin America, show 
that exporting firms possessing OLC benefitted from higher levels of exports (Vendrell-
Herrero et al., 2017). Amankwah-Amoah, Boso, & Debrah (2017) have argued that in 
contexts like Africa, characterised by lower levels of resource capability, exporting SMEs 
need “to develop a capacity to be frugal: an ability to reduce the complexity and cost of 
producing new products and services for” new markets “with an underlying mind-set of 
doing more with less” (Amankwah-Amoah, Boso, & Debrah, 2017, pp. 7). 
OLC provides firms with two important advantages. First, it enables firms to improve 
their stock of knowledge and enhance their external image by resorting to external 
collaborative activities, such as outsourcing research and development (R&D), and acquiring 
licenses and patents from different network partners (Bustinza et al., 2017; Carmeli et al., 
2017; Vendrell-Herrero et al., 2017), this enables them to develop more differentiated 
products and services thereby providing the firm with essential conditions to compete in 
international markets. Second, OLC helps reduce information asymmetries and cultural, 
geographical and institutional distances between firms and foreign customers, important 
barriers for SMEs located in more isolated regions like Africa. Hence, SMEs capable of 
acquiring external knowledge and of sending strong quality signals through collaborative 
outsourcing, licensing, and quality certifications, and of developing and using appropriate 
communication channels with domestic and foreign partners and clients like intranets (in the 
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case of B2B) and internet site (in the case of B2C) are more likely to succeed in foreign 
markets (Luo & Bu, 2016; Vendrell-Herrero et al., 2017). Various studies have demonstrated 
that market signals are particularly important for firms (Das & Bandyopadhyay, 2003), 
especially from developing markets (Newburry & Soleimani, 2011) because require dynamic 
and cooperative relations between exporting firms, local and foreign agents, suppliers and 
distributors, government officials and other network players that are conducive to increased 
learning, productivity and sales. OLC competences may become particularly important in 
environments characterised by higher levels of corruption as positive quality signals may help 
SMEs overcome negative corruption perceptions that foreign distributors and buyers may 
have about firms from such contexts. Hence, we hypothesise that: 
H4: In high corruption environments firms with higher OLC have a higher likelihood of 
exporting. 
 
Mutually reinforcing interactive effect between networking and OLC  
Current debates in the management literature are looking at the synergies and 
complementarities between managerial factors. Ennen & Ritcher (2010, p. 207) found that 
“complementarities are most likely to materialize among multiple, heterogeneous factors in 
complex systems”. The international marketing literature has already identified synergies 
between market orientation and network ties to enhance firm performance (Boso, Story & 
Cadogan, 2013). We argue that these synergies are relevant as well in the development of 
international competitiveness. Firms lacking internal resources need to leverage their 
networks, not only to achieve greater access to international markets, but also as a way to 
extract more value from their OLC. Similarly, OLC facilitate the management of networking 
ties between firms and with domestic and foreign partners and buyers. The capacities to 
resort to established networks and to develop OLC mutually reinforce each other, and enable 
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African SMEs to overcome some of the barriers prevalent in high corruption environments 
and hence increase their ability to export. As such, we hypothesize that:  
H5: In high corruption environments, there is a positive and mutually reinforcing effect 
between network and OLC that further increases the likelihood to export. 
 
To sum up, our theoretical framework contains five empirical hypotheses and uses the 
exposure to high corruption environment as a moderator between the independent variables 
(productivity, cluster and OLC) and the exporting status of firms. Figure 1 provides a 
conceptual diagram that shows all the relationships tested in the empirical section. 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The context and its relevance  
In recent times, Africa has been recognised as an important context presenting 
numerous opportunities for both managers and scholars (Angwin, Mellahi, Gomes & Peter, 
2014; Chikweche & Fletcher, 2014; Kamoche, 2011; Kamoche et al., 2012; Krüger & 
Strauss, 2015; Mellahi & Mol, 2015; Uzo & Mair, 2014). During the last decade the region 
has been in an important economic expansion, registering an average growth rate in the 
2008–2012 –crisis period of about 2% higher than that of the world economy (UNCTAD, 
2014) and continues to register one of the fastest economic and demographic growth rates in 
the world (World Bank, 2016). In terms of exports, the African continent has experienced an 
average growth rate of 4.9% from 2000-2011, representing a nearly 35% share of the 
continent’s total GDP (UNCTAD, 2014). This outflow activity has been coupled by an 
accentuated inflow of MNEs into Africa (Adjasi, Abor, Osei & Nyavor-Foli, 2012; Cleeve, 
This is the last author version of the Accepted Manuscript of the article (to be) published by Emerlad in International 
Marketing Review on 25th December 2017, DOI: 10.1108/IMR-03-2017-0054. 
 
18 
 
2012; Nwankwo, 2012; Wood et al., 2014; Kamoche & Siebers, 2015) and a consequent 
increase in inward FDI from $2.4 billion in 1985 to $66.5 billion in 2015 (Africa Investment 
Report, 2016; UNCTAD 2013).   
However, despite these recent improvements, primarily enhanced by state-marketed 
primary commodities, Africa lags well behind other regions in terms of global trade 
involvement and investment flows (Ibeh, Wilson & Chizema, 2012). Various factors such as, 
lack of international experience and managerial know-how and resources exhibited by SMEs, 
the high level of informal exporting, limited logistics and distribution infrastructure, 
underdeveloped business networks, challenging relationships with African neighbouring 
countries and high levels of transaction costs, have been indicated as major reasons 
explaining why the export potential is not fully realized (Okpara, 2012; Ibeh et al., 2012; 
Dibben & Wood, 2016). 
Similarly to what happens in other developing economies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016), 
African firms are exposed high levels of corruption; which represents an important barrier to 
internationalization (Ibeh, 1999; Kimuyu, 2007). To visualize the level of corruption in 
Africa and compare it to other regions we can resort to the corruption perception index
1
. This 
index has been published yearly since 1995 and captures the informed views of local analysts 
through a series of surveys in a wide spectrum of countries. The index has a broad acceptance 
in academia (i.e. Djankov et al, 2002) and takes values from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
maximum perceived corruption in public organizations and 10 the absence of corruption. 
Table 1 shows the average of the corruption perception index for different geographical 
regions for the periods 2010 and 2014. When comparing the corruption of African public 
organizations with the rest of the regions it can be seen that African public sectors are 
                                                 
1
 http://www.transparency.org/ 
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amongst the most corrupt. Despite there is some heterogeneity in the region, Africa is one the 
most corrupted continents, including economies like Zimbabwe (CPI2014 = 2.1) and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (CPI2014 = 2.2). The increasing participation of 
African SMEs in the international business arena has been facilitated by the implementation 
of a range of supportive government policies, such as the reduction of trade barriers and the 
strengthening of regulatory and legal systems. Above all, it has been enabled through the 
development of international activation mechanisms, and lower transaction/operational costs 
of physical environments (Ibeh et al., 2012). Within such a context, the creation of cluster 
zones has been particularly important as this type of soft policy requires from governments 
lower levels of financial investment. 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
Sample profile 
A large cross-sectional data set of African SMEs was obtained from the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/). It provides a representative sample 
of firm-level data comprising a diversity of factors such as financial data, business 
ownership, level of competition, marketing data, technology, and infrastructure. The data was 
collected by specialised organisations, under the supervision of the World Bank. The data 
was collected in a systematic manner by experienced interviewers, who were instructed not to 
provide inappropriate explanations to interviewees (managers and owners), in order to avoid 
interpretation bias. Respondents were guaranteed full confidentiality, as a way to encourage 
them to provide true information. Additionally, the accuracy level of response of each 
interviewee was also recorded. The fact that various important studies (cf. Jensen, Li & 
Rahman 2010; Glaister et al., 2014; Gomes et al., 2014; Luo & Bu, 2016; Vendrell-Herrero 
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et al., 2017) have used the World Bank enterprise survey data attests to the quality and 
reliability of the this dataset.  
Since the data was collected by specialised organisations but under the supervision, and 
with the support, of the World Bank, a very ample sample frame was created. A stratified 
random sampling technique was used in order to ensure a high level of representativeness of 
the data. The stratification was performed by taking into account geographical region, 
business sector, and firm size. The sample setting was generated from a list of firms obtained 
from each country’s national statistical office and from various other government agencies. 
One of the main advantages of this sample for our research design is that it contains 
information of perceived corruption at firm level, so it is possible to test self-selection 
mechanism in both high and low corruption environments.  
We used the data collected in 2010 from nine African countries: Angola, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa. These 
countries reflect the diverse administrative backgrounds of Africa with countries in our 
sample having Belgium, British, French, German, and Portuguese heritages. As can be seen 
in Table 1 the countries selected are on average highly corrupted (CPI2014 = 3.63), quite 
similar to the rest of Africa (CPI2014 = 3.29), and significantly more corrupted than European 
economies (CPI2014 = 6.61). 
To ensure a higher level of SME homogeneity, we only included firms with more than 
5 and less than 500 employees, and firms less than 40 years old. This selection procedure 
resulted in a dataset of 1,233 valid responses from a senior managers of manufacturing SMEs 
in the Food, Textile, Chemical, Plastic metal and non-metal, machinery, and other 
manufacturing sectors. Table 2 shows the country and industry distribution in our sample. 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
This is the last author version of the Accepted Manuscript of the article (to be) published by Emerlad in International 
Marketing Review on 25th December 2017, DOI: 10.1108/IMR-03-2017-0054. 
 
21 
 
 
Measures 
Exporting behaviour: The dependent variable is defined as a dummy variable 
(extensive margin), coded 1 if the firm has export sales and was coded 0 if the firm did not 
engage in exports (Cassiman & Golovko; Luo & Bu, 2016). As it is depicted at the bottom of 
Table 2, in our sample practically one fourth of the firms are exporters (23.7%). As a way to 
visualize the specificities of exporting firms Table 2 provide descriptive statistics (mean and 
standard deviation) for all variables used in this study for exporting and non-exporting 
subsamples. 
Corruption environments: Following the empirical approach of Cassiman & Golovko 
(2011) we test the relationship between productivity and exports in two different business 
environments, in our case low and high corruption. This variable has therefore a moderating 
role in our empirical model. Corruption is difficult to measure as its illegal nature means 
individuals involved in bribery or other forms of corruption are not likely to admit it (Cuervo-
Cazzurra, 2008). Therefore we used perceived levels of corruption, that in the sample appear 
as a Likert scale ranging from “1 No obstacle” (the perception that corruption is non-
existent), to “5 Severe obstacle” (the perception of very high level of corruption). We 
categorize firms responding “1” or “2” to this scale as being in low corruption environments, 
and firms responding “3”, “4” or “5” to this scale as being in high corruption environments. 
According to Table 2 42.5% of the firms in our sample perceive to be located in high 
corrupted environments. In the analysis this measure is analysed at firm level, however as a 
way to test the robustness of our corruption measure, we can correlate the aggregated 
measure at country level and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). As it is depicted in 
Figure 2 there is a high positive Pearson correlation (0.81) between the aggregated low 
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corruption percentage (for homogeneity multiplied by 10) and the CPI measured in 2010 
(similar results obtained with CPI in 2014). This high correlation at country level sheds 
credibility to our firm level measure.  
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
Labour Productivity: This (independent) variable is calculated as the ratio of total sales 
over labour expenses. Although some studies have measured labour productivity as the ratio 
of total Sales (P*Q) over number of employees (L), (Luo & Bu, 2016; Pessoa & Van Reenen, 
2014), in line with Vendrell-Herrero et al. (2017), we have adapted the measure by using the 
ratio of total sales over labour expenses. We believe that this measure is more appropriate 
because it eliminates any possible bias effects resulting from differences in currency values 
and inflation across the countries included in our sample. This is particularly the case because 
our respondents provided figures in different currencies. Attempting to overcome this 
limitation by converting all figures to the same currency (e.g. US$) would not have solved 
the problem because inflation rate differences would have made it difficult to warrant 
homogeneity in terms of the purchasing power of 1 US$ across the region. In order to 
overcome these issues, we used labour costs (W*L) instead of number of employees (L), and 
divided sales over labour costs (PQ/WL). As such, our measure of labour productivity is free 
of potential biases because the monetary values are cancelled by using a numerator and 
denominator measured in the same local currency. Our measure of productivity links revenue 
with each monetary unit spent in labour, an input already used in previous literature and 
named as labour expenses (Ortín-Ángel & Vendrell-Herrero, 2014), and therefore the average 
firm in our sample exhibits a value of approximately 8 monetary units for each unit invested. 
This variable is log transformed and as such its skewness decreases, fitting better to a normal 
distribution.  
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Cluster: This (independent) variable seeks to measure the access to local networks 
through the membership in a cluster association. In line with previous studies we created a 
dummy variable to measure the firms’ association to clusters (Aranguren et al., 2014). The 
variable is coded as 1 when the firm is associated with a cluster zone, and 0 otherwise. 
According to Table 2, 72% of exporting firms and 59% of non-exporting firms are affiliated 
to a cluster zone. This descriptive evidence seems to suggest that there are some exporting 
additionalities of being part of a cluster.  
Outward Looking Competences: This (independent) variable is an index directly 
borrowed from Vendrell-Herrero et al. (2017) and based on three binary dimensions available 
in the survey. The index is composed of three binary elements that determine knowledge 
acquisition (licensing) and signalling practices (website and quality certifications) and 
therefore have an impact on OLC competences. Vendrell-Herrero et al. (2017) argue that 
quality certifications have lower impact on OLC competences and therefore the OLC index is 
equal to (3*license + 3*website + 2*quality)/8. It is important to note that this index is a 
continuous variable that takes values between 0 and 1. According to Table 2 the index has an 
average value of 0.37 for exporting firms and 0.18 for non-exporting firms. This descriptive 
evidence seems to suggest that OLC competences are an important element for exporting.  
Firm size: We control for firm size as the existing literature seems to suggest that it 
may affect firms’ export activities (Dass, 2000), as larger firms tend to have a larger resource 
base than smaller firms, which facilitates their export capacity (Wolff & Pett, 2000). The 
average firm size of our sample is 52.8 employees. 
Firm age: In line with previous studies, we include firm age as a control variable as it 
seems to exert an influence on firm national and international expansion (Das 1995; Mata & 
Portugal 1994). The average firm age in our sample is of 15.2 years. 
This is the last author version of the Accepted Manuscript of the article (to be) published by Emerlad in International 
Marketing Review on 25th December 2017, DOI: 10.1108/IMR-03-2017-0054. 
 
24 
 
Owner’s origin: Previous studies have considered foreign ownership to be associated 
with internationalisation choices (Bhaumik et al., 2010; Hsu & Leat, 2000), as foreign 
owners are more likely of being able to provide firms with international experience and 
know-how (Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012). The dataset provides information about the 
nationality of the largest owner. As such we created a set of dummy variables to control for 
the nationality of the largest owner. As can be observed in Table 2, 44.5% of firms have an 
owner with an African nationality. The rest of owners are European (25.5%), Indian (7.8%), 
Lebanese (2.9%) and Asian (2.5%). The rest of owners (16.4%) have other backgrounds. 
 
Empirical model 
The aim of this research is to uncover how the traditional variable explaining exporting 
behavior of firms (productivity) are relevant only in low corruption environments, whereas in 
high corruption environments alternative explanations (capacity to networking or to engage 
with foreign markets) apply. Since our dependent variable, exporting behavior, is a binary 
variable, a logistic regression seems to be appropriate. In order to verify our hypotheses we 
test the Logit model in Equation 1, where the subscript i identifies each company, the vectors 
of coefficients γi, μi, and τi are the country, industry and owners’ origin fixed effects 
respectively, and εi are the robust standard error terms.  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝐶 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗
𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖                  (1) 
As common practice, in Table 3 we provide standard β coefficients and marginal 
effects for each parameter. The β coefficients provide an indication of the sign and 
significance of the relationship and therefore are used to accept or reject hypotheses, whereas 
marginal effects are used to quantify the economic impact of a particular explicative variable 
on the dependent variable (Greene, 2012). The model seeks to estimate the effect of an 
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interactive variable (β4). Ai & Norton (2003) show that common inconsistencies occur with 
software used to estimate the marginal effects of interactive terms. For instance, the 
interaction effect is conditional on the independent variables and may have different signs for 
different values of covariates. To interpret logistic models appropriately social science 
scholars strongly encourage the graphical interpretation of marginal effects (Hoetker, 2007; 
Vendrell-Herrero et al., 2018; Zelner, 2009). In this research we provide graphical support to 
the interpretation of the coefficient β4.  
In line with Cassiman & Golovko (2011), the research strategy proposed in this article 
is to test the model specified in Equation 1 for relevant subsamples (in our case firms located 
in low and high corruption environments) and to observe how the self-selection effect washes 
away under particular conditions (in our case in high corruption environments). The results of 
these estimations are shown in Table 3. Columns 1and 2 provide the βs and marginal effects 
for the full sample respectively (Model 1), columns 3 and 4 provide the results for the low 
corruption subsample (Model 2), and finally columns 5 and 6 depict the results for the high 
corruption subsample (Model 3).  
 [Please insert Table 3 here] 
To assess the accuracy of our empirical model an ex-post predictive analysis has been 
performed with the assumption that the probability of exporting in the population is equal to 
the one observed in our sample (23.7% for the full sample). Overall the model has a good fit. 
For example, in the full sample the model correctly predicts 75.26% of firms’ exporting 
decision. The models estimated for the subsamples also show high predictive capacity.  
 
Results 
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As a warm up exercise we have compared labour productivity distributions for 
exporting and non-exporting firms. By doing this we could test graphically whether the most 
productive firms are more likely to export. Interestingly, as it is shown in Figure 3 self-
selection mechanisms (more productive firms are more likely to export) are observed only for 
the subsample of firms in low corruption environments. In particular, according to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Wilcox, 2005) productivity distribution is significantly different 
at 10% for exporting and non-exporting firms in low corruption environments, whereas this 
result washes away in high corruption environments. From a visual interpretation of the 
figure we can see that in high corruption environments a high proportion of the most 
productive firms are non-exporters (see Figure 3). 
[Please insert Figure 3 here] 
A more in-depth analysis of the parameters β1 demonstrates that the results presented in 
Figure 3 are corroborated in Table 3. The relationship between labour productivity and export 
is positive in all models, but significant only in Model 2 (low corruption). In particular, for 
the low corruption subsample an increase of 1% in labour productivity leads to an increase of 
0.036 percentage points in the likelihood of a firm to export (β1>0; P-value < 0.05). This 
evidence supports our Hypothesis 2a. Regarding the other empirical hypotheses the results of 
the parameter β1 rejects our baseline hypothesis (H1) since the relationship between 
productivity and exports is non-significant for the full sample, but accepts Hypotheses H2b 
stating that the self-selection mechanism does not apply in high corruption environments. The 
remaining hypotheses seek to explore alternative explanations of exporting behaviour in high 
corruption environments; that is the reason why we will pay special attention to the results of 
Model 3 presented in Table 3. 
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Hypothesis 3 states that in high corruption environments, firms benefiting from 
network/cluster membership are more likely to export. According to Table 3 (Model 3) and 
considering the rest of variables remaining constant (et ceteris paribus), getting associated to 
a network/cluster leads to an increase of 11.2 percentage points in the likelihood of a firm to 
export (β2>0; P-value < 0.05). The results for the full sample are qualitatively similar. 
Consequently the results presented on Table 3 (Models 1 and 3) validate Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 states that in high corruption environments, firms deploying OLC are more 
likely to export. According to Table 3 (Model 3) and considering the rest of variables 
remaining constant (et ceteris paribus), a rise in 1% in the OLC index leads to an increase of 
0.173 percentage points in the likelihood of a firm to export (β3>0; P-value < 0.05). The 
results for the full sample are qualitatively similar. Consequently the results in Table 3 
(Models 1 and 3) validate Hypothesis 4. It is worth mentioning that according to our 
estimates, network/cluster and OLC are irrelevant in low corruption environments, where 
self-selection mechanism dominates. 
Hypotheses 5 states that there is a mutually reinforcing interactive effect between 
networking and OLC in enhancing firms’ export likelihood. The parameter β4 is statistically 
not distinguishable from zero in all models. Though, as we explained before, results 
regarding interaction terms in logistic regression are only averages and are, therefore, better 
interpreted through graphical representation (Ai & Norton, 2003; Hoetker, 2007; Vendrell-
Herrero et al., 2018; Zelner, 2009). This can be seen in Figure 4 for the case of the full 
sample, Figure 5 for low corruption environments and Figure 6 for high corruption 
environments. The bottom part of Figure 4 shows that when the predicted propensity to 
export (X-axis) for a given firm (after model estimation) is below 0.3 the parameter of the 
interactive term is positive and significant (Y-axis) above 5% (β4>0; p-value < 0.05). When 
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the predicted propensity to export is above 0.3 we cannot rule out the null hypothesis that the 
parameter of the interactive term (β4) is different from zero. The results are qualitatively 
similar for the high corruption sub-sample (Figure 6), but are non-statistically significant for 
the low corruption subsample (Figure 5). 
[Please insert Figures 4, 5 and 6 here] 
In sum, the evidence presented in Figures 4 and 6 suggests that in high corruption 
environments there are positive synergies between cluster and OLC for exporting only for 
those firms with relatively low probability of exporting. This means that are precisely those 
firms with low probability/capability to export the ones that can benefit from jointly 
deploying OLC and getting associated to a cluster network. The top of Figures 4, 5 and 6 
provide a histogram with the distribution of predicted probabilities to export for each sample. 
For the case of the full sample there is a high concentration of firms with a probability of 
exporting below 0.3. In particular 890 firms (72.2%) have a probability to export below 0.3 
(77.1% for the case of the high corruption sub-sample). This implies that according to the 
graphical analysis we can accept our Hypothesis 5 for a large proportion of the sample.  
Regarding our control variables (size and age) the results in Table 3 indicate that firm 
size significantly increases the likelihood of exporting in all models. In terms of economic 
impact, et ceteris paribus, an employment increase of 10% leads to an increase of 0.009 
percentage points in the likelihood of a firm to export (β5 >0; p-value <0.01). However, 
results suggest that firm age does not have an impact on exporting behaviour since we cannot 
rule out that the underlying parameter is distinct from zero (β6 = 0).  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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Implications to theory 
Our results provide important evidence in response to various scholars who demanded 
for the testing and validation of existing marketing (Arnould, Price & Moisio, 2006) and 
international business theories (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Michailova, 2011; Teagarden, Von 
Glinow & Mellahi, 2017) in different contexts, especially in the context of Africa 
(Amankwah-Amoah, Boso, & Debrah, 2017; Anakwe, 2002; Kamoche, Debrah, Horwitz, & 
Muuka, 2004; Kamoche et al., 2012). This is the first study testing the application of the self-
selection theory in the context of Africa. Our results show that in high corruption contexts, 
invisible barriers seem to have a detrimental effect on the capacity of African SMEs to 
compete in international markets, as more productive firms do not seem to be more capable 
of overcoming the barriers to export and therefore exhibit higher levels of exports. In that 
regard, our findings contribute to the vast body of knowledge on self-selection, by partly 
challenging the widely accepted assertion that more productive firms are more capable to 
export (Aw, Chung & Roberts, 2000; Melitz, 2003; Melitz & Ottoviano, 2008; Temouri, 
Vogel & Wagner, 2013). In fact, our results show that in high corruption environments more 
productive firms do not exhibit higher likelihood of selling to foreign markets. Thus, our 
evidence suggests that the well-established self-selection argument is not applicable to all 
contexts.  
We have identified two additional alternative factors explaining the capacity to export 
in high corruption environments; namely the access to cluster networks and the possession of 
OLC. By resorting to network clusters, firms are capable of overcoming ‘invisible barriers’ 
prevalent in high corruption environments like for instance speeding up bureaucratic 
processes, obtaining permits, etc. (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). The importance of networks in 
explaining the firms’ internationalization process is such that it “is seen as an entrepreneurial 
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process embedded in an institutional and social web which supports the firm in terms of 
access to information, human capital, finance, and so on” (Bell et al 2003; p. 341). It allows 
the firm to secure relevant information and contacts from its network which facilitates 
opportunity discovery. Social ties as a consequence of network membership can be 
particularly relevant in high corrupt environments as it allows the firm access to more fine-
grained and tacit information thereby strengthen its position.  
The results also emphasize the importance of OLC. Firms’ intention to acquire external 
knowledge strengthens its competitive position and makes it more likely to engage in export 
activities. The possession of OLC enables firms to build bridges to distant markets by 
sending positive signals through their internet and intranet, the possession of licensing 
agreements with foreign firms, and obtaining quality certifications (Vendrell-Herrero et al., 
2017). Firms which are based in countries with low levels of corruption tend to be more 
trusted not only by customers in their home country but also by customers located in foreign 
markets (Lin et al., 2016). As such, customers are more likely to buy products and services 
from firms based in countries where corruption is absent. The possession of OLC for African 
firms is therefore crucial to counteract the negative perception of being based in countries 
perceived to be highly corrupt.  
However, we need to note that our results do not make a fundamental criticism of the 
self-selection argument, but rather refine it in order to help understand what lies behind best 
performing firms in different contexts. Our results show that in low corruption environments 
it is more important to understand ‘the rules of market’ and focus on input minimisation – 
output maximisation, as a key condition to enter and succeed in export markets (Melitz, 
2003). In contrast, in high corruption contexts it becomes more important to understand the 
‘rules of the game’ and be able to tap into alternative mechanisms such as OLC and 
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networking ties in order to be able to ‘open the doors’ of the export market. This opens a line 
of investigation about the importance of understanding the dichotomy prevalent in 
developing markets (such as those in Africa), where firms are confronted with the need to 
choose between following the ‘rules of the game’ or the ‘rules of the market’. 
 
Practical implications  
African governments should first work towards the reduction of corruption levels as 
this is the only way to develop better and fairer market conditions that encourage firms to 
achieve competitiveness levels required to successfully operate in more competitive 
international markets. However, we are aware that the reduction of corruption is complex and 
requires time. Our results suggest that whilst in markets where corruption levels remain high, 
policy makers need to continue encouraging SMEs to export. To this end, clusters networks 
provide a valuable mechanism. Furthermore, policy makers should also recognise that, for 
this to be fully effective, cluster networks depend upon institutional support and social 
exchange that can be impaired by the presence of corruption. In parallel, policy makers and 
managers also should be aware about the importance of the use of inter and intranets and of 
the adoption of foreign technology in the form of licensing in order to strengthen their OLC. 
These insights may have resonance with other developing economies more generally. They 
may also be of interest to external funding bodies, such as development banks, seeking to 
help developing economies develop through targeted investments. 
 
Limitations and directions for further research 
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This paper has limitations, common to other prior survey-based studies, in using a 
cross-sectional approach to assess the exporting behaviour of firms. The insights may be 
extended by future studies using longitudinal methodology to capture better the dynamics of 
high corruption environments.  
This study uses data from nine African countries. Future studies testing these 
relationships in other African and developing markets will be welcome. While data collection 
in Africa still presents an important challenge to researchers (Klingebiel & Stadler 2015) the 
emergence of new and more reliable data from other African countries may allow additional 
analyses to be carried out to provide a more comprehensive picture of African exporting 
firms and the role of network clusters across the continent.  
Given that other variables such as levels of entrepreneurship, innovation, marketing 
capabilities, and export promotion programs may affect these relationships, future studies are 
encouraged to explore these relationships particularly in developing countries where 
corruption tends to be more prevalent. This study focuses on corruption but there are a 
number of institutional variables that could also affect these relationships. Thus, future 
studies are encouraged to examine the effects of other institutional and country factors that 
enable the identification of important nuances and further develop existing international 
marketing/business theories. 
Finally, while there have been a number of studies examining the antecedents of 
corruption, there have been few studies investigating the impact of corruption on the firm’s 
strategy (Lin et al, 2016; Lee & Weng, 2013). Thus, by pointing out the impact of corruption 
to explain the firm’s export activity, this study emphasizes the importance of low and high 
corruption environments as an antecedent in the international business and marketing areas. It 
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is hoped that this study will contribute to a better understanding of this topic and will 
stimulate further research in this area. 
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 Table 1. Corruption Perception Index by region in 2010 and 2014 
Geographical Region Number of countries CPI 2010 CPI 2014 
Africa (in the database) 9 3.30 3.63 
Africa (out of the database) 37 2.81 3.29 
Americas 28 4.08 4.34 
Asia Pacific 27 4.13 4.43 
East Europe and Central Asia 18 2.77 3.24 
European Union and Western Europe 31 6.45 6.61 
Middle East and North Africa 19 3.82 3.81 
All countries 169 4.03 4.33 
* The Corruption perception index takes value 0 when the perceived corruption in public sector is at its maximum and 10 when there is 
absence in perceived corruption. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the full sample and by exporting behaviour 
 
Mean and standard deviation (reported within parenthesis) 
 
Category  Exporting Non-exporting Total 
Relevant 
variables 
High Corruption 37.3% (0.48) 44.2% (0.50) 42.5% (0.49) 
Ln Labour Productivity (LP) 1.88 (0.27) 2.09 (1.74) 2.05 (1.65) 
Cluster  72.2% (0.45) 59% (0.49) 61.8% (0.49) 
Outward Looking (OLC) 0.37 (0.33) 0.18 (0.26) 0.22 (0.29) 
Size 99.08 (111.2) 38.5 (53.7) 52.8 (76.0) 
Age 17.8 (9.3) 14.4 (8.5) 15.2 (8.8) 
Industry Food 11.6% (0.32) 22.3% (0.42) 19.7% (0.40) 
Textile 26.7% (0.44) 15.7% (0.36) 18.3% (0.39) 
Chemical 12.7% (0.33) 7.8% (0.27) 9.0% (0.29) 
Plastic – Metal – non metal 19.5% (0.40) 18.4% (0.39) 18.6% (0.39) 
Machinery 6.5% (0.25) 3.3% (0.18) 4.0% (0.20) 
Other manufacturing 9.9% (0.30) 10.0% (0.30) 10.0% (0.30) 
Country Angola 2.7% (0.16) 8.7% (0.28) 7.2% (0.26) 
Botswana 3.7% (0.19) 5.9% (0.24) 5.4% (0.23) 
Burkina Faso 8.5% (0.28) 4.7% (0.21) 5.6% (0.23) 
Cameroon 5.1% (0.22) 6.3% (0.24) 6.0% (0.24) 
DRC 1.7% (0.13) 7.4% (0.26) 6.1% (0.24) 
Ivory 6.8% (0.25) 9.3% (0.29) 8.7% (0.28) 
Madagascar 18.1% (0.38) 8.6% (0.28) 10.9% (0.31) 
Mauritius 6.8% (0.25) 3.6% (0.18) 4.4% (0.20) 
South Africa 46.2% (0.49) 45.3% (0.50) 45.5% (0.50) 
Owner’s origin African 28.4% (0.45) 50.0% (0.50) 44.5% (0.50) 
Indian 4.8% (0.21) 8.7% (0.28) 7.8% (0.27) 
Lebanese 3.7% (0.19) 2.6% (0.16) 2.9% (0.17) 
Asian 3.4% (0.18) 2.2% (0.15) 2.5% (0.16) 
European 38.3% (0.49) 21.5% (0.41) 25.5% (0.44) 
Other 21.2% (0.41) 14.9% (0.36) 16.4% (0.37) 
Sample size  292 941 1233 
This is the last author version of the Accepted Manuscript of the article (to be) published by Emerlad in International 
Marketing Review on 25th December 2017, DOI: 10.1108/IMR-03-2017-0054. 
 
40 
 
Table 3. Binary Choice model (Logit). 
 Depvar: Export 
Behaviour 
Model 1 
Full sample 
Model 2 
Low corruption environment 
subsample 
Model 3 
High corruption environment 
subsample 
Coeff. Variable name Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Marginal 
effect 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Marginal 
effect 
(Std. error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Marginal 
effect 
(Std. error) 
β1 LP 0.0787 0.012 0.218
** 0.036** 0.00775 0.0007 
  (0.0828) (0.012) (0.102) (0.017) (0.156) (0.0157) 
β2 Cluster 0.625
** 0.089** -0.0550 -0.009 1.034** 0.112** 
  (0.284) (0.038) (0.470) (0.079) (0.449) (0.053) 
β3 OLC 1.306
** 0.194*** 1.120 0.184 1.724** 0.173** 
  (0.517) (0.075) (0.968) (0.160) (0.763) (0.075) 
β4 Cluster*OLC 0.614 0.0911 0.723 0.119 0.359 0.036 
  (0.594) 0.088 (1.038) (0.171) (0.940) (0.095) 
β5 Size 0.00654
*** 0.0009*** 0.00620*** 0.001*** 0.00889*** 0.00089*** 
  (0.00110) (0.0002) (0.00129) (0.0002) (0.00257) (0.00027) 
β6 Age 0.0103 0.0015 0.00977 0.0016 0.0102 0.0010 
  (0.00918) (0.0014) (0.0124) (0.0020) (0.0142) (0.0014) 
μi Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
γi Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
τi Owners’ origin FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Intercept -3.273***  -2.611***  -4.288***  
  (0.394)  (0.577)  (0.731)  
 N 1233  708  525  
 pseudo R2 0.218  0.198  0.321  
 Correctly 
predicted 
      
 Exporters 72.95%  71.04%  77.98%  
 Non-Exporters 75.98%  73.33%  80.29%  
 Total 75.26%  72.74%  79.81%  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The parameters concerning interactive terms are average coefficients and hence they do not depend on the firm’s probability of exporting. 
The correct parameters are available in figures.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework and hypotheses 
 
 
Figure 2. Correlation between CPI2010 and average corruption at country level in our dataset.  
 
 
Figure 3. Labour productivity distribution by exporting behaviour 
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Figure 4. The graphical analysis of the parameter of the interaction term between Outward 
Looking Competences and Cluster membership, full sample (Table 3, Model 1). 
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Figure 5. The graphical analysis of the parameter of the interaction term between Outward 
Looking Competences and Cluster membership, low corruption subsample (Table 3, Model 
2) 
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Figure 6. The graphical analysis of the parameter of the interaction term between Outward 
Looking Competences and Cluster membership, high corruption subsample (Table 3, Model 
3) 
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